Chats on the Charles

Oxus, known locally as Amu Darya, is the major river of Central Asia and a recurring presence in the history of  Western conquests and withdrawals from the region since the time of the Macedonian king Alexander in the fourth century B.C.  His armies crossed the river at least three times in his long and ultimately tragic pursuit of dominance in Afghanistan and South Asia.  Today, millennia later, another Western military power contemplates its options on the banks of the Oxus.

In a few weeks, the latest United States war presence in Afghanistan will exceed sixteen years. Not only is this the longest running war in American history, perhaps more surprisingly, it may also be one of the longest in Afghan history. For a country known as the Graveyard of Empires and one that has tangled with leading world powers for thousands of years, that is quite an achievement.

President Trump is set to announce the updated American strategy for the war later tonight. With all the political drama in D.C., these deliberations have receded from the headlines or have focused on tactical decisions on troop numbers or whether to privatize the war.  The strategic decisions disclosed tonight could have far reaching implications for the security of the United States and the stability of the heavily nuclearized South Asian region.

To discuss the President’s strategy and its chances of success, later this week we will host Dr. Nishank Motwani, Visiting Fellow at the Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy and a Researcher at the International Institute of Strategic Studies. He has visited Kabul several times and recently co-edited a comprehensive volume called Afghanistan – Challenges and Prospects. The book provides an assessment of the current state of politics in Afghanistan and what United States military strategists must keep in mind as they plan the next phase of this war. I hope General MacMaster’s staff is reading this book.

Let’s set the table for the President’s announcement and our conversation.

America went back into Afghanistan in 2001 to defeat and capture American proxies from the prior war with the Soviet Union. These proxies, as many had predicted at the time, went rogue and perpetrated the horrific attacks of 9/11 on New York and Washington. The initial military successes were mixed. The Taliban were defeated and uprooted, and while many Al Qaeda combatants were killed or captured, the main leaders scattered in the bad lands of the Afghan Pakistan border or the teeming cities of Pakistan. Over sixteen years, through drone strikes and counter-insurgency we were able to decimate the ranks of Al Qaeda. However the progress against the Taliban was not sustained. They re-instituted under the watchful eye of Pakistani and Middle-Eastern intelligence services and launched a successful effort to re-capture territory and threaten the government in Kabul.

In order to begin to assess a revised war strategy for Afghanistan, the key question to address is: What are the strategic interests of the United States in that country?

There are two primary strategic priorities for the United States to care about the stability of Afghanistan.  First, is to reduce or eliminate ungovernable spaces from where new attacks can be planned or launched on the homeland.  Second, we need to ensure that the country, particularly its Pashtun tribal belt, does not further radicalize or destabilize the heavily nuclear armed state of Pakistan next door.

While there are many other secondary benefits from stabilizing Afghanistan, for example reducing narcotics and human trafficking flows to Central Asia and Europe, none rise to the level of strategic priorities for America.

How can these strategic priorities be achieved?

At this stage there are potentially three possible options for the United States.

1. Build a modern Afghan state that can control its territory and provide a stable governing entity in a historically volatile region. The only way to achieve this is a complete victory over the Taliban.  This is a multi-generational project that will cost trillions of dollars and a significant increase in the number of civilian and military personnel from the United States and other allies. It will also require some stern diplomacy and possibly military action to reduce Pakistani support for the Taliban.
2. Keep a minimally deterrent force in the country to ensure the survival of the government in Afghanistan while putting pressure on the Taliban and Pakistan to come to the negotiating table and negotiate some de-facto power sharing agreement. While this may not result in a Jeffersonian democracy on the banks of the Amu Darya, it is likely to reduce the ungovernable spaces available to terrorists. In addition, it will move the onus of containing Pashtun nationalism to the Pakistani state.
3. Withdraw all U.S. troops and hope the resulting vacuum will force regional actors like Russia, Iran, India and Pakistan to cobble together a compromise solution. This is the highest risk strategy with the least likelihood of success. Its allure, however, is its simplicity and cost effectiveness in the time of America First.

America is most likely to settle on the second option. This option should increase the pressure on the Taliban, Haqqani network and assorted ISIS affiliates, allowing for a reduction in ungovernable spaces. Unfortunately, it will further radicalize the Pakistani state as the bad actors cross over the porous border and wait out the battlefield surge. Without an effective strategy to counter Pakistan’s negative influence on the Taliban, this strategy is unlikely to resolve the conflict conclusively or bring the parties to the negotiating table. The President with his knack for showmanship will clearly spin this announcement as some major departure from past administrations. However, make no mistake, it is more of the same, with troop levels adjusted to prolong the battlefield stalemate.

Unfortunately, America’s longest war looks like it will set a few more records.

Please tune in later this week for our discussion with Professor Motwani.